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Trust Propensity across Cultures: The Role of Collectivism
ABSTRACT
Does collectivism influence an individual’s willingness to trust others? Conflicting 
empirical results from past research and the role of trust in international marketing make this 
question important to resolve. We investigate this question across cultures and at the individual 
level with four studies using multiple methods. Study 1 establishes correlational evidence 
between societal-level collectivism and individual-level trust propensity with results from a 
multi-level analysis of data from over 6,000 respondents in 36 different countries. Study 2 offers 
an individual-level analysis using the trust game, introducing a more rigorous behavioral 
outcome variable. Study 3 contributes causal evidence at the individual level based on 
experiments in both the US and China and offers evidence of social projection as the explanatory 
mechanism. Finally, Study 4 demonstrates managerial relevance by using advertising to prime 
collectivism and assessing its effect on trust in the firm. 
Keywords: trust, cultural values, individualism, collectivism, experiments, multi-level modeling
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Trust plays a critical role in international marketing (Aulakh et al. 1996) including in 
relationships between international exchange partners (Katsikeas et al. 2009; Wang et al. 2020), 
international strategic alliance partners (Robson et al. 2008), and even between consumers and 
brands (Chaudhuri and Holbrook 2001; Xie et al. 2015). Identifying how trust is developed in the 
context of parties who are otherwise unfamiliar with each other has been identified as an 
important area of inquiry for international marketing (Samiee et al. 2015). 
The development of trust is influenced through a number of factors and cognitive 
processes (Doney et al. 1998). One such factor driving the development of trust is trust 
propensity, which is an individual difference variable defined as a generalized expectancy that 
the words or promises of others are reliable (Rotter 1967). Trust propensity is important because 
it not only contributes to the formation of trust, but it establishes the initial level of trust prior to 
any knowledge of the trustee. This is relevant as marketers are exposed to new relationships in 
which trust is important, for example, with customers in new foreign markets or team projects 
across organizational and national boundaries (Colquitt et al. 2007). In such situations involving 
unfamiliar actors and objects, trust propensity may be the most relevant trust antecedent (Bigley 
and Pearce 1998). 
This raises a key question as to what factors predict differences in trust propensity. It has 
been suggested that there may be cross-cultural differences in trust propensity, particularly 
focusing on the cultural value of collectivism (Huff and Kelley 2003; Johnson and Cullen 2002). 
However, the relationship between collectivism and trust propensity is not well understood, 
suffers from competing conceptual arguments, and empirical results have offered conflicting 
evidence about its role. Collectivism is defined as the view of the self as either a relatively 
independent and autonomous actor (i.e., individualism) versus an interdependent actor embedded 
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in groups (i.e., collectivism) (Hofstede 1980). The competing conceptual arguments can briefly 
be summarized as on the one hand, collectivism’s focus on harmony and collaboration with 
others has been argued to support a positive relationship between collectivism and trust 
propensity. In contrast, others have suggested that the association between collectivism and trust 
propensity is constrained due to collectivism’s concurrent emphasis on strong family and group 
ties, which produces security but not trust (Yamagishi 2011). Still others suggest that both 
individualism and collectivism can each have a positive effect on trust development depending 
on the cognitive process used to develop trust (Doney et al. 1998). Another competing 
perspective suggests that the best cultural predictor of trust propensity may not be values, but 
rather the strength of social norms and sanctioning in societies, a concept Gelfand et al. (2006) 
conceptualize as cultural tightness.
Empirically, findings have been inconclusive and contradictory with some finding 
evidence of a positive relationship between collectivism and trust propensity (Zeffane 2017), 
others a negative relationship (Huff and Kelley 2003), and still others no relationship (Torres and 
Bligh 2012). Thus, given the contradictory and inconclusive state of research on the relationship 
between collectivism and trust propensity, and the importance of trust in international marketing, 
the objective of this study is to provide new theoretical insights and robust empirical evidence on 
the relationship between collectivism and trust propensity. 
In the conceptual development section, we review the literature and acknowledge the 
competing theoretical perspectives on cross-national differences in trust propensity. Yet, as 
preview to our findings, we consistently find a positive relationship between collectivism and 
trust propensity. We propose a theoretical framework that explains differences in trust propensity 
based on social projection as the theoretical mechanism linking collectivism and trust propensity. 
Page 3 of 57




Social projection theory (Krueger 1998), whose main tenets are that people tend to believe that 
others are similar to them in terms of how they think, feel, and behave, offers a new theoretical 
lens through which we can explain differences in trust propensity using collectivism as 
antecedent to trust propensity. 
Empirically, we offer robust and converging evidence by combining multiple studies. 
This includes a large-scale study of approximately 6,000 respondents spanning 36 countries, in 
which we offer strong correlational evidence of a relationship between collectivism and trust 
propensity. However, although societal-level studies can offer evidence of correlation, evidence 
of causation in such studies can only be argued theoretically. One remedy identified by 
Oyserman and Lee (2008) is the use of experiments involving priming study respondents as an 
effective means to simulate chronic intercultural value differences and demonstrate that cross-
national differences (e.g., in trust propensity) are indeed due to value differences such as 
collectivism. Thus, using individual-level experiments makes the discovery of causal evidence 
possible by isolating confounding variables. We complement the large cross-cultural study with 
four experiments to offer converging empirical evidence. We highlight the contribution and key 
elements of each study in Table 1.
We suggest that our study contributes to the literature on trust propensity as follows. 
Cultural tightness and its emphasis on norms and social sanctions (Gelfand et al. 2006) has been 
advanced as a theoretical explanation for differences in trust propensity (Yamagishi 2011). 
Instead, we introduce social projection theory as an explanatory mechanism to account for the 
relationship between collectivism and trust propensity. In the multi-level study (Study 1), we 
directly compare the effect of cultural tightness to the effect of collectivism in predicting trust 
propensity, and the results seem to favor the proposed values-based explanation.
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Further, by introducing social projection theory and conducting experiments, we bring 
greater clarity to the relationship between collectivism and trust propensity which has had 
contradictory results in prior research (e.g., Huff and Kelley 2003; Zeffane 2017). The combined 
empirical evidence in the studies we report offers strong support of a positive relationship 
between collectivism and trust propensity and in part explains differences in cross-national 
differences in trust propensity.
We suggest that one reason for the inconclusive empirical findings in past research is that 
many studies examining trust propensity rely on the World Values Survey (WVS), which uses 
only a single item with dichotomous response categories (e.g., Brockman et al. 2020; Delhey and 
Newton 2005; Johnson and Cullen 2002). Although convenient, this item falls short of generally 
accepted psychometric guidelines and this may in part explain conflicting results. To overcome 
this shortcoming, we employ a more rigorous multi-item latent construct approach, which offers 
a finer-grained measure with more variance in the range of trust propensity. In addition, instead 
of relying solely on a self-report of trust propensity, in Study 2, we employ a behavioral measure 
to indicate trust propensity.
Existing studies on collectivism and trust are correlational studies and regardless of their 
sample size are inadequate at offering evidence of causation due to confounding variables and 
the inability to isolate the effect of cultural values. Therefore, in addition to the large sample 
multi-country multi-level study, we report results from individual-level studies that manipulate 
collectivism (interdependent self-construal) to offer causal evidence of the role of collectivism. 
Finally, we highlight the managerial relevance of this research by demonstrating that 
firms can use marketing communication to prime collectivism in consumers to instill greater 
trust propensity. This is valuable because it more closely resembles actual methods through 
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which marketers communicate to potential buyers and offers a more rigorous test.
“Insert Table 1 about here”
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND
Conceptualization of Trust Propensity
In a business environment increasingly reliant on various forms of interfirm cooperation, 
the role of trust as a foundation for effective economic exchange and development has been well 
established (e.g., Knack and Keefer 1997). The literature distinguishes between at least three 
perspectives on trust. The first perspective focuses on the relationship. This perspective views 
trust as a willingness to rely on an exchange partner in whom one has confidence (Moorman et 
al. 1993) or as “trust as existing when one party has confidence in an exchange partner’s 
reliability and integrity” (Morgan and Hunt 1994, p. 23). The second perspective focuses on the 
characteristics of the trustee. This concept has generally been called trustworthiness (Mayer et al. 
1995; Tullberg 2008) and in short suggests that some people are more likely to be considered 
trustworthy. 
The third perspective, which is the focus of this study, focuses on a person’s 
predisposition to trust others, i.e., trust propensity. We note that others have used different labels 
for this concept, such as dispositional trust (Kramer 1999), generalized trust (Nee et al. 2018), 
social trust (Bergh and Öhrvall 2018), or interpersonal trust (Rotter 1967). Trust propensity is an 
important concept because the characteristics of the trustor play a stronger role than those of the 
trustee in developing trust, especially in the early stages of a relationship (Jones and Shah 2016). 
Rotter (1967) conducted some of the foundational research into what he called 
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interpersonal trust, or the general expectation that the word, promise, verbal or written statement 
of another could be relied upon. Following this seminal research, subsequent studies established 
that some people have a greater tendency than others to be trusting (Colquitt et al. 2007). This 
perspective views trust propensity as a general disposition that a person would carry from one 
specific situation to another. 
Trust Propensity across Cultures
Empirical research on the relationship between trust propensity and individualism-
collectivism has been inconclusive. Some have found evidence of a positive relationship between 
collectivism and trust propensity (Zeffane 2017). Others have found evidence of a negative 
relationship (Huff and Kelley 2003), and others still have found no relationship between trust 
and collectivism (Torres and Bligh 2012). 
Some of this empirical ambiguity may be due to the frequent use of what we consider a 
psychometrically suboptimal way to operationalize trust propensity. The WVS includes a single 
item, which researchers have used as a proxy for trust propensity: “Generally speaking, would 
you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” 
The dichotomous response categories were “Most people can be trusted” and “Can’t be too 
careful.” Based on this question researchers have calculated the percentage of people within a 
country responding that most people can be trusted (Johnson and Cullen 2002). Most 
psychometric guidelines would advise against drawing firm conclusions of data using a single 
item with a dichotomous response category. Given the shortcomings of this measure, it is 
perhaps not surprising that the results are inconsistent across the different waves of the WVS. 
Indeed, over the seven waves of data collected by the WVS Association from 1984-2020, the 
correlation between the WVS trust item and Hofstede’s collectivism is sometimes positive and 
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sometimes negative and ranges from 0.14 to -0.56.  Furthermore, depending on which wave is 
being analyzed, a variety of countries that are quite different from each other, e.g., China, 
Sweden, and Saudi Arabia, have had the highest level of agreement with the WVS trust question. 
Thus, empirical analysis based on WVS data is psychometrically suboptimal, and empirical 
findings would be more credible if combined with other studies using alternative measures of 
trust propensity. 
Alongside ambiguous empirical results, a review of the literature reveals conflicting 
perspectives on how individualism-collectivism is expected to relate to trust propensity. Given 
the lack of empirical consensus and theoretical counterarguments, we review both perspectives.
Collectivism and Trust Propensity
The individualism-collectivism value reflects the relationship between individuals and 
society as being either individual-focused or group-focused. Collectivism refers to a society in 
which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups that throughout 
people’s lives continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. In contrast, 
individualism refers to a society in which the ties between individuals are loose. Everyone is 
expected to look after him or herself and his or her immediate family (Hofstede et al. 2010). 
Individualist values stress personal responsibility and achievement, and individuals are self-
oriented rather than group-oriented. In collectivist societies, individuals are integrated into 
cohesive in-groups, and group goals and norms outweigh personal goals and attributes in guiding 
behavior (Triandis 1995).
Collectivist societies have been described as trust-based societies where reciprocity 
norms and mutual interdependence govern relationships (Hofstede 1980). For example, Japan 
has been used as an illustration of a country that emphasizes trust and cooperation (Hagen and 
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Choe 1998), epitomized by the Japanese concept of Wa, which emphasizes sharing, cooperation, 
warmth, and fellowship (Rohlen 1974). It has been suggested that through an institutional 
environment that fosters goodwill, trust, and cooperation, Japanese firms are able to lower 
transaction costs and generate higher relational rents compared with Western counterparts (Dyer 
and Singh 1998). Similarly, when conflicts arise in societies with strong collectivist values, 
conflicts should preferably be worked out through mutual discussion or mediation. The use of 
legal documents and enforcements is evidence of mistrust, which tends to be a strong contrast 
with more litigious individualist societies (Sullivan and Peterson 1982). In effect, trust serves as 
a foundation for social and business relationships. In contrast, individualist societies tend to be 
dominated by arm’s-length relationships (Samaha et al. 2014). Members of individualist 
societies generally desire independence from any sort of group affiliation and relationships are 
formed primarily with a self-serving purpose (Steensma et al. 2000). Combined, these arguments 
suggest a positive relationship between collectivism and trust propensity. 
However, several theorists have advanced a competing perspective. For example, Huff 
and Kelley (2003) suggest that aspects of collectivist culture inhibit trust and that collectivists are 
relatively ineffective with strangers. Yamagishi (2011, p. 1) opens his book on trust with the 
claim that “the collectivist society produces security but destroys trust [emphasis added].” Rather 
than trust, collectivist societies depend on a system of mutual monitoring and social sanctioning 
to enforce compliance with social norms. Yamagishi (2011) suggests that this collective system 
of mutual sanctioning guarantees mutual cooperation in tight-knit groups, but it leads to 
insecurity in a broader social environment where such a system does not exist. An example of a 
public policy initiative that demonstrates this perspective is the recent development of a social 
credit system in China. It is designed to punish untrustworthy behavior, e.g., spreading false 
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information or breaking traffic rules, and reward trustworthy behavior like helping neighbors 
(Kostka 2019). Such a system goes beyond the informal institution of social norms by 
introducing formal guidelines and punishment and could be viewed as an indicator of low social 
trust and the necessity for formal social regulation to provide assurances. This competing 
explanation for cross-national differences in trust propensity has been referred to as cultural 
tightness, which suggests that strong social norms and sanctions compel others to act in 
predictably reliable ways and that violating trust would be punished with social sanctions 
(Gelfand et al. 2011). The social norms and sanctions argument has also been advanced as a 
theoretical explanation linking collectivism and trust propensity (Hagen and Choe 1998). 
However, at the same time cultural tightness has been argued as distinct from collectivism 
(Triandis 1989) and has been found to be only moderately correlated with collectivism 
(Carpenter 2000). For example, Gelfand et al. (2006) identify Brazil as being collectivist but 
culturally loose and Germany as individualist but culturally tight. 
We suggest that the focus on harmony and collective good embodied by the value of 
collectivism suggests that collectivism has a positive relationship with trust propensity. The 
compliance and predictably reliable behavior found in culturally tight societies is less reflective 
of trust and more reflective of coercive compliance as a remedy to low trust. In sum, trust seems 
to be more instrumental to the functioning of society in collectivist cultures, suggesting that trust 
propensity is higher in collectivist societies. 
H1: There is a positive relationship between collectivism and trust propensity. 
Social Projection of Individual-level Values
Collectivism is not only a country-level variable. There is an individual-level equivalent 
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to individualism-collectivism often referred to as independent vs. interdependent self-construal 
(Markus and Kitayama 1991) which has been investigated as such in the international marketing 
literature (e.g., Hui et al. 2011). Importantly, individuals from an individualist heritage (e.g., 
North American, Western European) are more likely to have an independent self-construal; 
whereas individuals with a background originating from a collectivist heritage (e.g., East Asian, 
Latin American) have a tendency to have an interdependent self-construal (Fischer and Poortinga 
2012; Peterson and Barreto 2018; White et al. 2012). 
Accepting that coll ctivism is a value that can be held at the individual level, social 
projection then is a theoretical lens that could offer valuable insights into how collectivism 
influences trust propensity and account for trust variation within cultures. For example, in 
collectivist cultures social projection theory would account for people with low trust propensity 
by virtue of their individual-level self-construal and whether it was independent (individualist) or 
interdependent (collectivist). Social projection theory has a long history in social psychology and 
its key thesis is the tendency to assume that others are similar to oneself, or in other words, 
people use one’s own characteristics as the basis for judging others’ characteristics (Overbeck 
and Droutman 2013). Katz and Allport (1931) introduced the term social projection, after finding 
that students who admitted to cheating on an exam were more likely to expect that others were 
also cheating. Assigning similar attributes or attitudes toward others (i.e., most other people 
cheat) as one holds for oneself is a way to reaffirm and justify one’s own actions (i.e., it’s ok for 
me to cheat). Social projection serves as a fundamental pillar of a functioning society and rests 
on the assumption that “humans continually perceive others and predict what these others think, 
feel, and, most importantly, what they will do” (Krueger 1998, p. 163). 
Empirical evidence has shown that social projection tends to be strong regardless of 
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whether people predict attitudes, behaviors, or personality traits. For example, people who 
support a particular political candidate are more likely to believe that most other people also 
support the same candidate (Van Boven et al. 2012). People’s own behavioral preferences for 
competition or cooperation predict whether they think others prefer competition or cooperation 
(Dawes et al. 1977). Social projection extends to values in general and to individualism-
collectivism in particular. For example, Overbeck and Droutman (2013) found that with respect 
collectivism values, participants showed social projection onto others’ beliefs. In other words, 
the participant’s collectivism value, which we refer to as one’s own collectivism, resulted in a 
belief that others also held collectivism values, which we refer to as the perceived collectivism of 
others. In sum, social projection appears to be a well-established phenomenon and emerging 
evidence suggests that it extends to cultural values. 
Applying social projection theory to the context of cultural values and trust propensity, 
we suggest that people who hold collectivism values will tend to socially project those same 
values onto others, creating a perceived collectivism consensus. Whether the other person 
actually shares the collectivism value is irrelevant. The important factor is the perception and 
belief that the other person shares the collectivism value. While one’s own degree of collectivism 
may indicate a greater propensity to trust others, it is logical that the perception of whether others 
share that collectivism value plays a role. Indeed, trust propensity is the belief by the trustor that 
the trustee will act benevolently (e.g., Lewicki and Wiethoff 2000). If the trustor believes the 
trustee has a shared concern for the group, then the trustor would feel more confident of the 
trustee’s intentions, i.e., that the trustee would act in an honest and fair manner. Thus, social 
projection helps us understand the mechanism that connects collectivism with trust propensity.
H2: The positive relationship between one’s own collectivism and trust propensity is 
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mediated by the perceived collectivism of others.
 
STUDY 1 – LARGE SCALE MULTI-LEVEL ANALYSIS
Sample
Study 1 offers a test of H1 with a large sample of respondents from multiple countries. 
The sample was obtained in collaboration with the X-Culture project (Taras 2019). X-Culture is 
a global team project with participants from universities around the world. As part of the project, 
participants completed a questionnaire, which included the individual-level trust propensity 
construct. We gathered trust propensity data from 6,429 participants from 44 countries. We only 
included data from countries for which at least 20 responses had been collected, a quantity 
consistent with other international marketing research estimating multi-level models with 
respondents nested within countries (e.g., Steenkamp and Geyskens 2006). This reduced our 
sample to 6,326 responses from 36 countries.1 Table 2 reports the sample characteristics with 
average age of 24 years (SD = 5.24) and nearly even gender split (51.4% female).2 This matched 
sample approach where participants share key characteristics (e.g., young and college educated) 
while differing primarily on nationality helps control for nuisance variables, and is similar to 
sampling techniques used by Schwartz (teachers and students) and Hofstede (IBM employees). 
“Insert Table 2 about here”
Measures
We measured trust propensity with a four-item construct adapted from Mayer and Davis 
(1999). The items include: 1) Most people can be counted on to do what they promise to do, 2) 
Most people can be trusted, 3) Most people are honest about their skills and abilities, and 4) 
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People are generally good and are trying their best. The measure’s reliability was strong (α = 
0.88) and we used an average trust propensity index in the mixed model.
To ensure robustness of results, we merged the individual-level data with cultural values 
data from three separate values frameworks: Hofstede et al. (2010), Schwartz (1994), and 
Minkov (2018). For the analysis based on Hofstede, data were not available for four countries in 
our sample, which reduced the sample size to 6,112 from 32 countries. We complement the 
analysis using the cultural framework based on Schwartz. At the national, cultural level, 
Schwartz (1994) developed a circular model of seven cultural values. However, he further 
condensed the values into two dimensions: conservatism and mastery. The conservatism 
dimension measures the extent to which individuals focus on the group versus the self, and is 
conceptually similar to what has generally been referred to as individualism-collectivism (Shao 
et al. 2010). Unavailability of Schwartz data for a few countries led to a final sample size of 
5,889 from 28 countries for the Schwartz-based analysis. Finally, Minkov (2018) has provided a 
recently updated cultural values framework based on new data gathered from 53,000 respondents 
across 56 countries. Minkov attempted to replicate Hofstede’s framework, but his analysis only 
found support for the existence of individualism-collectivism and long-term orientation as 
coherent cultural dimensions. He suggests that power distance is a sub-dimension of collectivism 
and that masculinity and uncertainty avoidance lack coherence. Thus, we conduct a third analysis 
based on Minkov’s data with a sample size of 5,830 from 28 countries. 
Control Variables
For each cultural values framework, we control for the other dimensions suggested by the 
framework.3 We also control for two individual-level sociodemographic variables (age and 
gender). Finally, we control for two country-level economic differences that may affect trust 
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propensity, societal inequality, measured by the Gini index, and GDP per capita (Bergh and 
Bjørnskov 2014). 
Model Estimation
The sample data is multi-level with respondents nested within countries. Applying 
ordinary least squares regression to multi-level data is inappropriate, because the resulting 
estimates will be biased and the estimated standard errors of the effects will be too small (Aitkin 
et al. 1981). Hierarchical linear modeling (HLM), or mixed modeling, has been developed to 
deal with multi-level data. It enables the simultaneous estimation of relationships of variables at 
two (or more) levels, using iterative maximum likelihood estimation. Following best-practice 
guidelines, we centered the respondent-level predictors (Level 1) within countries, and grand-
mean-centered the country-level predictors (Level 2) (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).
Results
Table 3 reports descriptive characteristics and correlations between variables, and results 
of the HLM model are presented in Table 4. We report unstandardized coefficients as 
standardized coefficients are problematic due to variance being partitioned across different 
levels. We first estimated the null model using the full sample of 6,326 observations. The 
intercepts for trust propensity vary significantly across countries (Wald Z = 3.70, p < 0.001), and 
the intraclass correlation suggests that 10.48% of the variance in trust propensity is due to 
between country differences. Next, we estimated a series of cross-level main effects models to 
observe differences in trust propensity using three different cultural value frameworks. We began 
with Hofstede’s (2010) framework, which revealed a positive relationship between collectivism 
and trust propensity (b = 0.008, p < 0.001). The results are consistent using Schwartz’s (1994) 
conservatism index, i.e., collectivism, which has a positive effect on trust propensity (b = 0.389, 
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p = 0.02), and the findings are consistent when using scores provided by Minkov et al. (2017) (b 
= 0.002, p = 0.02). Combined, these findings suggest consistent support for H1.
With respect to control variables, the Hofstede values of uncertainty avoidance and long-
term orientation and Schwartz’s mastery values are nonsignificant. Hofstede’s masculinity value 
(b = 0.004, p = 0.05), and Minkov’s flexibility dimension (b = 0.001, p = 0.02) are significant. 
Females have marginally higher trust propensity when analyzed with the available data used in 
the Hofstede analysis, but not with the slightly smaller datasets used in the Schwartz and Minkov 
analyses. None of the other covariates, age, GDP per capita, or Gini index are significant. In 
sum, across all three values frameworks, we find consistent evidence that collectivism is 
positively related to trust propensity.
“Insert Table 3 about here”
“Insert Table 4 about here”
Cultural Tightness. The presence of strong cultural norms and sanctions referred to as 
cultural tightness (Gelfand et al. 2006) has been advanced as an alternative to collectivism as an 
explanation for cross-national differences in trust propensity (Yamagishi 2011). Gelfand et al. 
(2011) measured cultural tightness with items such as “In this country, there are very clear 
expectations for how people should act in most situations,” and “In this country, if someone acts 
in an inappropriate way, others will strongly disapprove.” See Web Appendix A for the full list 
of items. 
To test cultural tightness as an alternative explanation, we re-estimated the multi-level 
model including the most recent country-level cultural tightness scores reported in Eriksson et al. 
(2021), which included scores for 57 countries. Matching that list of countries to those in our 
data produced smaller datasets to analyze in terms of number of countries (Hofstede 24, 
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Schwartz 23, Minkov 23) compared to the results in Table 4. When including cultural tightness 
in the multi-level model of these smaller samples, the effects of collectivism on trust propensity 
remain significant across all three cultural frameworks (Hofstede b = 0.010, t = 4.65, p < 0.001; 
Schwartz b = 0.459, t = 2.34, p = 0.03; Minkov b = 0.002, t = 2.22, p = 0.04). In contrast, cultural 
tightness is nonsignificant when estimated alongside Hofstede framework (tightness b = -0.125, t 
= -1.06, p = 0.30), the Schwartz framework (tightness b = -0.091, t = -0.60, p = 0.55) and the 
Minkov framework (tightness b = -0.259, t = -1.31, p = 0.21). We also estimated a model that 
included tightness without any other values scores. This resulted in 24 countries with scores and 
the model produced results consistent with the earlier model. Cultural tightness was not a 
significant predictor of trust propensity (b = 0.092, t = 0.70, p = 0.49).
Discussion
The finding that collectivism is positively related to trust propensity provides some 
clarity to a research question that has long plagued the field. Reliance on the WVS with its single 
trust question and dichotomous response options inadequately addresses the important question 
of how cultural values influence trust propensity. Importantly, we also tested a competing 
theoretical explanation, cultural tightness, and the findings based on the analysis of a large 
sample of individual respondents nested within countries on a multiple-item trust propensity 
measure make a meaningful contribution to this literature by highlighting the role of collectivism 
on trust propensity. 
Although these findings have high external validity by employing country-level data on a 
large sample of participants and using multiple cultural values frameworks, the study is subject 
to certain limitations. Notably, the study is correlational in nature leaving the possibility for the 
reverse relationship, i.e., a society consisting of individuals with high trust propensity fosters the 
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development of the collectivism value. Further, the theoretical mechanism for how collectivism 
influences trust propensity is still unclear. We attempt to systematically address these limitations 
in the upcoming studies. Although we believe that the multi-item latent construct employed to 
measure trust propensity is superior to the WVS single item, it only measures people’s attitudes. 
Therefore, in Study 2, we add a behavioral outcome measure of trust propensity using the trust 
game. In Study 3, we prime collectivism and individualism values to establish causal evidence 
and test the social projection hypothesis, and finally in Study 4 we examine a managerially 
relevant outcome variable, trust in the firm, using advertising as the priming mechanism.
STUDY 2 – THE TRUST GAME
The trust game offers a rigorous test of the hypothesis by employing a behavioral 
outcome variable as a measure of trust propensity instead of multi-item self-report measure. The 
trust game, sometimes referred to as the investment game, is an economics experimental tool 
often used in trust research (Berg et al. 1995). The basic procedure of the game, employed in this 
study, is as follows. A participant (trustor) is given an endowment of money, ten dollars. The 
trustor is told that they have the opportunity to entrust their money with another unknown player 
(trustee). The entrusted money is tripled by the experimenter, which the trustor is aware of, and 
then the trustee has the option to return all, some, or none of the money to the trustor. To 
maximize the potential economic gain for both parties, the trustor should send all of the money 
(ten dollars) to the trustee, which after being tripled would mean that the trustee has thirty dollars 
to share. Then, the trustee should return an amount larger than ten dollars to the trustor. 
However, given that the trustee might not share any money back with the trustor, the trustor may 
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choose to send a lower amount (or even zero dollars) to ensure that the trustor retains at least 
some (or all) of the original endowment. Thus, based on the design of the game, the amount of 
money sent by the trustor is a behavioral reflection of the trustor’s trust propensity (Berg et al. 
1995; Brülhart and Usunier 2012). 
Participants and Procedure
We recruited 185 business student participants (53% male) and conducted the experiment 
in the behavioral lab of a US university. In our version of the game, there is only one live person 
playing (the trustor) since we are concerned only with the initial trust propensity of the trustor. 
Participants were informed that the amount returned by the trustee would be determined by a 
virtual player whose responses are based on those of live players in prior experiments, 
specifically Berg et al. (1995) and Cox (2004); thus the amounts returned reflected the decisions 
of actual participants from other studies. Participants were also informed that although they 
would be using play money during the experiment, twenty percent of them would be randomly 
selected to be paid in US dollars in the amount as determined by the probability table. Random 
payment procedures have been used as cost-saving devices in other trust game studies (e.g., Cox 
2009) and research suggests that random payment does not systematically affect behavior (Bolle 
1990). Participants were asked whether they really believed that there was a chance that they 
could win some money. The mean response was significantly above the midpoint of the five-
point scale (M = 3.91, t = 12.17, p < 0.001), which indicates that the game was perceived to have 
real behavioral consequences.
Participants first completed a computer questionnaire which explained the trust game 
process and offered two training exercises. Afterwards, participants were taken to a break-out 
room, where a lab assistant repeated the instructions of the game. Participants were given $10 
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(play money) and asked to insert any amount of money into an envelope to send to the trustee. 
Immediately following, we asked participants to complete a questionnaire which included the 
collectivism items. Collectivism was measured with a four-item scale based on Yoo et al. (2011); 
items are listed in Web Appendix A. The scale demonstrated good reliability (α = 0.86) and we 
averaged all items to create a collectivism index.
Results
The mean amount of money participants inserted into the envelope to be entrusted was 
$6.94. The most frequent amounts entrusted were $5 and $10, which is consistent with other trust 
game studies (Berg et al. 1995; Cox 2004). To estimate the effect of collectivism on trust 
propensity, we conducted regression analysis using the amount of money participants inserted 
into the envelope as the dependent variable and the participant’s collectivism index as 
antecedent. The results indicate a significant effect of collectivism on the amount of money 
entrusted (b = 0.34, t = 2.71, p < 0.01), and remain consistent when controlling for age, gender, 
and income. 
Discussion
The Study 2 results offer evidence of a relationship between collectivism at the individual 
level and an alternative measure of trust propensity. Instead of a self-report of whether others can 
be trusted, a rigorous behavioral measure was used, implying collectivism influences individual-
level behavior and underscoring the relevance of understanding the role of collectivism. 
Combined, Studies 1 and 2 offer correlational evidence of the effect of collectivism on trust 
propensity. To provide robust evidence and causally isolate the effect of a specific value, it is 
also advisable to attempt to isolate the effect of values and offer more direct evidence of 
causation. To accomplish this goal, in Studies 3 and 4, we make the value temporarily accessible 
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through cultural priming (Oyserman and Lee 2008), which allows us to test for causal evidence.
STUDY 3 – CAUSATION AND MEDIATION
In Study 3, we offer two contributions to the understanding of the link between 
collectivism and trust propensity. First, we offer further evidence of causality in the relationship 
between collectivism and trust propensity by priming the collectivism value for one group of 
participants and observing the effect on trust propensity compared to a group primed with 
individualism. The two contrasting views of the self as interdependent (collectivism) and 
independent (individualism) coexist in individuals, and each view can be temporarily activated 
(Aaker and Lee 2001). As such, we can examine the effect of collectivism on trust propensity in 
an experimental setting by priming individualism-collectivism at the individual level (Oyserman 
and Lee 2008; White and Simpson 2013). Second, we provide evidence for a social-projection-
based model by examining the influence of one’s own collectivism values onto others resulting 
in a perceived collectivism consensus. 
Participants and Procedure
We conducted two separate experiments in two distinct cultural environments as a check 
on robustness and generalizability of the manipulation. The first experiment was conducted in 
the US, where we recruited 100 US participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk consumer 
panel. The second experiment was conducted in China where we recruited 106 Chinese 
participants using WeChat, a multipurpose mobile application used for messaging, social media, 
and mobile payments. A limited number of messaging groups were invited to participate in the 
survey and be entered into a lottery for a nominal financial award (150 RMB). The use of 
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crowdsourced samples, such as MTurk and WeChat, have been deemed suitable for experimental 
research, especially when multiple sources are used (Hulland and Miller 2018). Complete sample 
characteristics for both experiments are provided in Table 2.
We employed the same one-way between-subjects ANOVA design (individualism versus 
collectivism) in both experiments. Thus, in order to examine the effect of collectivism on trust 
propensity in an experimental setting, we prime individualism-collectivism at the individual level 
as has been done in other research (Oyserman and Lee 2008). Participants were randomly 
assigned to one condition, and completed the priming task (see Web Appendix B), which was an 
adapted version of the similarities and differences with family and friends (SDFF) task 
(Trafimow et al. 1991). Participants in the collectivism condition described three things they had 
in common with their family and friends, and then described an experience when they sacrificed 
something for the good of the group. Conversely, participants in the individualism condition 
described three things that made them unique compared to their family and friends, and then 
described an experience when they accomplished a goal independently. 
We measured trust propensity (DV), perceived collectivism of others (mediator), and 
collectivism of self (manipulation check) with four-item scales. Trust propensity (US α = 0.90; 
CN α = 0.83) was measured with the same scale as in Study 1 based on Mayer and Davis (1999). 
We created a new scale to measure the perceived collectivism of others by modifying the scale 
used to measure one’s own collectivism (US α = 0.93; CN α = 0.91). One’s own collectivism 
was measured with the same scale based on Yoo et al. (2011) as in Study 2. Items demonstrated 
good reliability (US α = 0.88; CN α = 0.90) and were averaged to create a collectivism index. All 
items and experimental procedures were pre-tested in a pilot study4 with US participants, and all 
items are listed in Web Appendix A.
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First, to check whether the priming task was effective, we compared the two groups on 
collectivism using ANOVA. As expected, participants assigned to the collectivism condition 
scored higher on collectivism than those assigned to the individualism condition in both the US 
sample (MCollectivism = 4.88, MIndividualism = 3.95, F(1, 98) = 10.76, p = 0.001) and the Chinese 
sample (MCollectivism = 5.23, MIndividualism = 4.36, F(1, 104) = 10.24, p = 0.002). With respect to 
trust, participants in the collectivism condition scored higher on trust propensity than participants 
in the individualism condition for both the US sample (MCollectivism = 3.75, MIndividualism = 3.23, 
F(1, 98) = 7.60, p < 0.01) and the Chinese sample (MCollectivism = 3.68, MIndividualism = 3.40, F(1, 
104) = 4.28, p = 0.04). These results offer causal evidence and support for H1. Participants’ 
perceptions of the collectivism of others were also greater in the collectivism condition than in 
the individualism condition for both the US sample (MCollectivism = 4.73, MIndividualism = 4.01, F(1, 
98) = 5.35, p = 0.02) and the Chinese sample (MCollectivism = 4.89, MIndividualism = 4.32, F(1, 104) = 
5.01, p = 0.03). 
To test whether social projection mediates the relationship between collectivism and trust 
propensity, we used Model 4 of the Hayes (2017) PROCESS macro to detect any significant 
indirect effects. The experimental condition (individualism-collectivism prime) was modeled as 
the focal antecedent, and the respondent’s estimate of others’ collectivism as the mediator. We 
also included age and gender as covariates. Results reported in Table 5 indicate a significant 
effect of the condition (individualism = 0, collectivism = 1) on the mediator, perceived 
collectivism of others, in both the US sample (b = 0.72, t = 2.26, p = 0.03) and the Chinese 
sample (b = 0.46, t = 1.83, p = 0.07). When trust propensity is regressed onto both the condition 
and the perceived collectivism of others, the condition is marginally significant in the US sample 
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(b = 0.34, t = 1.88, p = 0.06) and nonsignificant in the Chinese sample (b = 0.10, t = 0.86, p = 
0.39). More importantly, the respondent’s perceived collectivism of others is significant in both 
the US sample (b = 0.25, t = 4.41, p < 0.01) and the Chinese sample (b = 0.28, t = 6.21, p < 
0.01). A 90% bootstrap confidence interval based on 5,000 bootstrap samples for the indirect 
effects (US b = 0.18; China b = 0.13) is entirely above zero for the US [0.040, 0.360] and China 
[0.003, 0.271], indicating a significant indirect effect of collectivism on trust propensity.
As a robustness test and to offer a more direct cross-cultural comparison, we repeated the 
mediation analysis using country as the focal antecedent instead of the experimental condition. 
Country (US/China) is not a perfect proxy for individualism-collectivism especially since half 
the sample in each country was primed with individualism and the other half collectivism. 
However, the US and China are near cultural polar opposites with respect to individualism-
collectivism and regression analysis using country (US = 0, China = 1) as the focal antecedent 
produced supportive results. The effect of country on the perceived collectivism of others was 
nearly significant (b = 0.43, t = 1.86, p = 0.06). When regressing trust propensity on both country 
and perceived collectivism of others, the effect of country weakened (b = -0.07, t = -0.61, p = 
0.54) while the effect of perceived collectivism of others (b = 0.28, t = 7.89, p < 0.01) was 
strong. Further the bootstrap confidence interval is entirely above zero [0.014, 0.237] supporting 
the indirect effect.
“Insert Table 5 about here”
Discussion
The experimental results from Study 3 offer causal evidence that is consistent with the 
findings from Studies 1 and 2. Combined, these studies offer strong support for the positive 
relationship between collectivism and trust propensity. Further, the results support the social 
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projection hypothesis, which suggests that the effect of one’s own collectivism value indirectly 
influences trust propensity through one’s perception of the collectivism of others. In other words, 
people project their own level of collectivism onto others; then believing that others share a 
benevolent concern for others, people are more likely to trust others.
STUDY 4 – COLLECTIVISM, TRUST PROPENSITY AND TRUST IN THE FIRM
In Study 4 we not only seek further evidence of the causal link between collectivism and 
trust propensity found in Study 3, but also add managerial relevance by examining the distal 
effects on a managerially relevant dependent variable, i.e., trust in the firm. Further, instead of 
priming collectivism with a writing task as done in Study 3, we use advertising messages as a 
managerially relevant prime, as has been done in prior research (Ma et al. 2014). 
Customer perceptions of the firm, such as trust in the firm, are an important and relevant 
aspect of marketing performance (Katsikeas et al. 2016). According to a 2019 Gallup survey 
(Khoury and Crabtree 2019), 60% of US adults, and 68% of adults worldwide, believe 
corruption is widespread in business indicating a lack of trust. Thus, firms in general have a 
strong need to rebuild the perception of trust.
Given that trust propensity is defined as the expectancy that the words or promises of 
others are reliable (Rotter 1967), we expect that trust will be extended unto firms. In sum, the 
model in Study 4 is a serial multiple mediation model; collectivism (vs. individualism) 
advertisement → participant’s collectivism → trust propensity → trust in the firm.
We accomplish this by presenting advertisements to participants, so the manipulation 
itself is a relevant managerial tool. We expected to find that exposure to advertisements 
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emphasizing collectivism values would activate the participant’s interdependent self, affecting 
their trust propensity and ultimately trust in the firm.
Participants and Procedure
We recruited US consumers for the experiment by employing graduate students trained in 
recruiting techniques to collect responses and direct participants to an online survey. The sample 
consisted of 211 participants (51.7% male, Mage = 38.6). Complete sample characteristics are 
provided in Table 2. To begin the experiment, participants were randomly assigned to view one 
of two different sets of advertisements (one emphasizing individualism values and the other 
collectivism values) in order to prime the participant’s level of collectivism. Each set included a 
print and video advertisement for a fictitious insurance company called CAPCO (see Web 
Appendix C). Participants viewed the video advertisement, followed by the print advertisement. 
We then measured the participant’s trust in the firm (α = 0.91), trust propensity (α = 0.82), the 
participant’s own level of collectivism (α = 0.68), and perceived collectivism of the firm as a 
manipulation check (α = 0.94). All measurement items are reported in Web Appendix A. 
Results
First, we conducted an ANOVA to test whether participants who viewed the collectivism 
advertisements perceived the company to be positioned as more collectivist than participants 
who viewed the advertisements emphasizing individualist values. The results indicate that the 
advertisements were perceived as intended with respect to the perceived collectivism of the firm 
(MCollectivism Ads = 4.74, MIndividualism Ads = 2.25, F(1, 209) = 500.43, p < 0.001). 
To assess whether the collectivism versus individualism positioned advertisements had a 
significant effect on trust in the firm, we conducted a serial mediation analysis in SPSS using 
Model 6 of the PROCESS macro which executes a series of regression models (Hayes 2017), 
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whose results are reported in Table 6. The first model results indicate that the condition 
(individualism ads = 0, collectivism ads =1) had a significant effect on the participant’s level of 
collectivism (b = 0.31, t = 2.91, p < 0.01). The second model revealed that the participant’s 
collectivism significantly predicted their trust propensity (b = 0.17, t = 3.18, p < 0.01). More 
importantly, the final model, which assessed the effect on trust in the firm, implied the presence 
of serial mediation with a significant effect of trust propensity (b = 0.40, t = 4.99, p < 0.01), but 
nonsignificant effects of the condition (b = 0.14, t = 1.49, p = 0.14) and the participant’s 
collectivism (b = 0.02, t = 0.32, p = 0.75). We tested the significance of the serially mediated 
indirect effect of the condition (condition → collectivism → trust propensity → trust in the firm) 
using 5,000 bootstrap samples which estimated an effect of b = 0.02 with a 95% confidence 
interval that did not include zero [0.004, 0.047]. Thus, the viewing of advertisements 
emphasizing collectivism values had a significant indirect effect on trust in the firm.
“Insert Table 6 about here”
Discussion
Study 4 offers evidence of a causal relationship between collectivism and trust propensity 
building on the correlational evidence from Studies 1 and 2 and adding to the causal evidence 
from Study 3. Further, an indirect effect on trust in the firm was observed. Notably, the level of 
participant’s collectivism was the result of a priming induced by positioning in advertisements, 
which could be used as practical guidance for managers to enhance consumer trust in their firm. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Trust is an increasingly important concept in international marketing as consumers 
Page 27 of 57




encounter new foreign and global brands and as organizations expose employees to new 
relationship situations through cross-functional and oftentimes virtual teams, structural 
reorganizations, and collaborative projects across organizational and cultural boundaries 
(Colquitt et al. 2007). Our multi-method approach across four studies incorporated multi-level 
data from many countries to establish correlational evidence, followed by individual-level 
experiments that incorporated a behavioral measure of trust, offered causal evidence, identified 
social projection as the theoretical mechanism, and demonstrated the effect in a managerially 
relevant context. In sum, we found strong evidence that one’s own collectivism value influences 
trust propensity and demonstrated that collectivism (interdependent self-construal) can be 
activated at the individual level through marketing communication. The findings have a number 
of theoretical and managerial implications.
Theoretical Implications
Prior research on the drivers of trust propensity often centered on personality traits (e.g., 
Alarcon et al. 2018), and efforts to examine cultural value influences on trust propensity are 
characterized by competing perspectives and conflicting results. The theoretical perspective we 
adopt is that collectivism’s focus on harmony and collaboration with others is associated with 
trust propensity through the mechanism of social projection. Others have suggested that 
individualism can have a positive effect on trust development (Doney et al. 1998), and still 
others suggest that the strength of social norms and sanctioning in societies, a concept Gelfand et 
al. (2006) terms cultural tightness, is a predictor of trust propensity.
The results observed in the multi-level model with data from 6,326 participants from 36 
countries suggest significant cross-cultural differences with respect to trust propensity influenced 
by the collectivism value. The data offer evidence of the relationship, however, we also 
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recognize that significant within-country variance on values is common. So, although there 
appear to be cross-cultural differences, just as with cultural values, it is only on the average that 
trust propensity varies from country to country and cannot be assumed that any particular 
individual from a given country has more or less trust propensity. Although cultural tightness is a 
conceptually appealing predictor of trust, our multi-level model based on a large sample of 
individuals nested within countries suggests that cultural tightness does not predict trust 
propensity. Instead, the evidence suggests a positive relationship between collectivism and trust 
propensity, helping to clarify the role of collectivism with respect to competing perspectives. 
The evidence for the relationship between collectivism and trust propensity appears 
particularly strong for several reasons. First, this investigation not only establishes correlational 
evidence of the relationship, but by experimentally priming the collectivism value, it offers 
causal evidence of the relationship. Second, trust propensity was measured in a number of ways. 
Instead of relying on the psychometrically weak WVS single-item dichotomous measure, trust 
propensity was assessed in this investigation using a multi-item measure, which may explain 
some inconsistencies in past research, and in the trust game in Study 2, a behavioral measure of 
trust propensity was used.
In our view, perhaps the most impactful theoretical implication revolves around 
independent vs. interdependent self-construal, the individual-level manifestation of individualism 
vs. collectivism. We successfully activated the collectivism value experimentally even when 
using advertising messages as the stimuli. The consistent findings at the societal and individual 
levels across these studies offer additional support for the assertion by Oyserman and Lee (2008) 
that some cultural values can be investigated at the individual level using experiments as has 
been done with individualism-collectivism (White et al. 2012), power distance (Gao et al. 2016), 
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and long-term orientation (Bearden et al. 2006). In so doing, we established causal evidence of 
the relationship between collectivism and trust propensity, as well as identified the potential for 
marketers to do the same in order to induce trust propensity.
Social projection offers a new lens through which to view the collectivism – trust 
propensity relationship. Social projection clarifies how collectivism influences propensity to trust 
others. A person’s own collectivism value through the process of social projection creates a 
perceived collectivism consensus between the self and others. Assuming a shared concern for the 
welfare of others, the trustor develops a greater trust propensity. It is important to note that a 
perceived collectivism consensus is merely a perception and does not necessarily reflect reality; 
it can sometimes be a false consensus (Ross et al. 1977). In other words, the perception of others 
to some degree merely reflects one’s own preferences. Although the prevalence of collectivism 
itself is predictive of trust propensity, Study 3 offers evidence that it is the perceived collectivism 
of others that drives trust. Indeed, in the US sample the direct effect of collectivism is rather 
weak and it is not close to significance in the Chinese sample when the mediator, perceived 
collectivism of others, is included in the model.
We focus on a trust-inducing value; however, other values and attitudes that potentially 
facilitate or hinder trust development could also be socially projected. It is not simply the 
perceived consensus that facilitates trust, rather it is the perceived consensus in a trust-inducing 
value that develops trust propensity. Indeed, in some of the earliest research on social projection, 
students who cheated believed that the majority of other students cheated as well (Katz and 
Allport 1931). Thus, people who have a disposition toward dishonesty would be likely to believe 
that others are dishonest as well, therefore hindering trust development. 
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Implications for managers are highlighted primarily in the results of Study 4, which 
tested the theoretical model using a priming process that more closely resembles reality and 
measuring a downstream consequence of trust propensity, i.e., trust in the firm. Trust in the firm 
has become increasingly important. According to a 2019 Gallup survey, the view of corporations 
as being corrupt is a majority view worldwide (Khoury and Crabtree 2019). Thus, understanding 
one of the antecedents to trust in the firm is a step in the right direction for firms to address the 
problem. 
The priming task from Study 4 highlights a potentially useful tool for firms. Priming 
values in research studies has typically been accomplished by asking study participants to 
complete a cognitive task such as arranging words in an order that produces logical sentences or 
writing about an experience identifying similarities and differences with family and friends, as 
employed in Study 3. Study 4 demonstrated that the collectivism value could also be activated by 
asking study participants to view advertisements. Since this procedure more closely resembles 
how firms communicate with buyers, it implies that trust in the firm may be influenced indirectly 
through promotional messaging that stresses collectivism values.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Trust propensity is a disposition to trust others that would influence many areas of life. 
Study 4 places participants in a consumption context of evaluating a firm; however, the other 
studies are not context specific. So, extending these results to other specific managerial situations 
would be helpful and further study is warranted. The samples, especially in Study 1, represented 
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a generally young population, and the trust disposition of older people could potentially differ. 
Thus, to bolster confidence in the managerial implications, a replication of studies using middle-
aged managers could be undertaken. However, age was controlled for in the Study 1 mixed 
model and was nonsignificant, and when included as a covariate in the analyses for Studies 2, 3 
and 4, the results are consistent. 
While this investigation offers causal evidence for the link between collectivism and trust 
propensity, additional research should seek to identify moderators of the collectivism-trust 
relationship. Study 4 indicates how firms could position marketing communications to prime 
consumers’ collectivism and leverage the collectivism-trust relationship to enhance trust in the 
firm. However, the identification of additional variables that actually moderate the collectivism-
trust relationship would benefit managers by offering additional managerial levers.
Within reason we tried to limit the differences between the ads in Study 4 to words and 
images relevant to the values as much as possible. However, we balanced that need with the goal 
of providing a more real-world-like stimulus to activate either individualism or collectivism. 
Thus, different ads might offer even greater control over potential confounds.
We tested only one trust-relevant value, collectivism. There are likely other trust-relevant 
values that potentially compete for influence on trust propensity and perhaps even counteract the 
positive effect of collectivism. The results from Study 1 suggested that masculinity (Hofstede 
framework) and flexibility (Minkov framework) are significant predictors of trust propensity. 
Given the centrality of individualism-collectivism as the most important cultural value, we 
limited the scope in this paper to that value. However, future research may want to investigate 
further the effects of masculinity, flexibility, and other potential predictors of trust propensity. 
Particularly, the effect for masculinity seems somewhat counterintuitive as one might expect that 
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feminine values, such as compassion and nurturing would be more closely related to trust 
propensity than masculine values, such as assertiveness and toughness. Thus, future research 
may want to investigate this finding further. 
Trust propensity is a disposition and not a sole determinant of any situationally-specific 
trust. So, while understanding the collectivism profile of another person or their culture offers 
some insight about their trust propensity, it is only a starting point. The trustor’s willingness to 
trust a specific trustee will change based on experience. However, this research offers evidence 
that the collectivism value of the trustor influences the foundational starting point of the initial 
willingness to trust others.
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1A sensitivity analysis with different cutoff rules (15, 25, and 30) produced results robust 
to different cutoffs. We present results with 20 as the cut-off. 
2Unfortunately, 498 respondents had missing information for gender. To avoid losing 
valuable sample size, we coded missing data as 0.5. Results were robust if these responses were 
excluded from the analysis. 
3Power distance was not included in the Hofstede analysis because it is strongly 
correlated with collectivism. However, a model that includes power distance in the analysis 
produces qualitatively identical results. Collectivism still has a significant relationship, whereas 
power distance (as expected given its correlation with collectivism) has a significant positive 
effect. Given our conceptual focus on collectivism, it seems appropriate to focus on that value in 
the empirical analysis. 
4Pilot study included 83 US participants (47% female, Mage = 37) from Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk consumer panel. Participants were randomly assigned to either the collectivism 
or individualism condition, and completed the SDFF priming task. The priming task was 
effective, (MCollectivism = 4.97, MIndividualism = 3.95, F(1, 81) = 11.99, p < 0.001), and participants in 
the collectivism condition scored higher on trust propensity than participants in the individualism 
condition (MCollectivism = 3.78, MIndividualism = 3.32, F(1, 81) = 7.37, p < 0.01).
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Table 1. Overview of study properties and contribution
Study Collectivism Trust Propensity Contribution
1 Societal level




Large scale, cross-cultural, 
multilevel evidence
6,326 respondents, 36 countries
2 Individual level, measured Behavioral – 
money entrusted
Behavioral outcome measure at 
the individual level
3 Individual level
Primed using writing task
Individual level 
4-item measure







ad primes, trust in the firm
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Table 2 Sample characteristics 
Study 1 Study 2 (US) Study 3 (US) Study 3 (China) Study 4 (US)
Characteristic Frequency % Frequency % Frequency % Frequency % Frequency %
Total n 6,326 185 106 100 211
Countries 36 1 1 1 1
Gender
Male 2,832 48.6 99 53.5 37 34.9 68 68.0 102 51.7
Female 2,996 51.4 86 46.5 69 65.1 32 32.0 109 48.3
Age
18-29 5,497 86.9 183 98.9 75 70.8 39 39.0 74 35.1
30-39 629 9.9 2 0.2 21 19.8 43 43.0 53 25.1
40-49 155 2.5 0 0.0 8 7.5 11 11.0 30 14.2
50-59 41 0.6 0 0.0 2 1.9 6 6.0 34 16.1
60+ 4 0.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 1.0 20 9.5
Education
Some high school NA 0 0.0 1 0.9 0 0.0 1 0.5
High school 
diploma NA
26 14.1 11 10.4 8 8.0 15 7.1
Some college NA 158 85.4 20 18.9 29 29.0 34 16.1
Bachelor degree NA 1 0.5 45 42.5 54 54.0 110 52.1
Graduate degree NA 0 0.0 29 27.4 9 9.0 51 24.2
Annual Household 
Income
<$24,000 NA 17 9.2 15 14.2 11 11.0 15 7.2
$24,000-44,999 NA 4 2.2 42 39.6 34 34.0 13 6.3
$45,000-74,999 NA 17 9.2 25 23.6 31 31.0 50 24.0
$75,000-120,000 NA 55 29.7 16 15.1 17 17.0 58 27.9
>$120,000 NA 92 49.7 8 7.6 7 7.0 72 34.1
Income band cutpoints for Chinese sample in RMB are 25,000; 75,000; 125,000; and 175,000. 
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Table 3 Study 1 Correlation matrix and descriptive statistics
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1 Trust Propensity 1             
2 Conservatism (S) 0.15** 1            
3 Mastery (S) 0.04** 0.48** 1           
4 Collectivism (H) 0.20** 0.50** 0.02 1          
5 Masculinity (H) 0.03* 0.25** 0.34** -0.11** 1         
6 Uncertainty Avoid (H) 0.04** -0.24** -0.70** 0.43** -0.18** 1        
7 Long-Term Orient (H) 0.02 -0.47** -0.28** 0.01 -0.35** 0.18** 1       
8 Collectivism (M) 0.16** 0.84** 0.29** 0.76** 0.23** 0.10** -0.29** 1      
9 Flexibility (M) -0.06** -0.44** 0.07** -0.57** -0.17** -0.37** -0.63** -0.66** 1     
10 GDP per Capita -0.14** -0.49** -0.04** -0.89** 0.12** -0.38** 0.08** -0.79** 0.54** 1    
11 Gini 0.01 0.54** 0.59** 0.16** 0.41** -0.32** 0.75** 0.46** -0.57** -0.09** 1   
12 Age -0.05** 0.07** 0.11** -0.06** -0.02 -0.14** 0.05** -0.01 0.05** 0.00 0.05** 1  
13 Gender (male=1) -0.05** -0.06** -0.01 -0.09** -0.06** -0.06** -0.04** -0.10** 0.09** 0.06** -0.05** 0.04** 1
Mean 3.72 3.66 4.02 38.63 56.25 60.64 38.48 4.49 -12.30 36,901 43.94 24.08 0.51
SD 0.70 0.27 0.15 30.03 11.48 18.61 21.86 70.60 83.98 19,484 6.74 5.24 0.48
** p < 0.01; * p <0.05 H = Hofstede framework, S = Schwartz framework, M = Minkov framework. Collectivism variable estimates are the reverse-coded results for 
the Hofstede and Minkov individualism indexes for consistency with the other studies.
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Table 4 Study 1 HLM results
Analysis based on Hofstede Analysis based on Schwartz Analysis based on Minkov
Individual N 6,112 5,889 5,830
Number of Countries 32 28 28
Predictor Estimate
Standard 
Error t p Estimate
Standard 
Error t p Estimate
Standard 
Error t p
Intercept 4.184 (0.433) 9.65 0.00 1.111 (1.165) 0.95 0.35 3.861 (0.301) 12.82 0.00
Collectivism (H) 0.008 (0.002) 4.79 0.00
Masculinity (H) 0.004 (0.002) 2.09 0.05
Uncertainty Avoid (H) -0.002 (0.002) -1.34 0.19
Long-Term Orient (H) 0.000 (0.001) 0.19 0.84
Conservatism (S) 0.389 (0.157) 2.48 0.02
Mastery (S) 0.364 (0.261) 1.40 0.17
Collectivism (M) 0.002 (0.000) 2.54 0.02
Flexibility (M) 0.001 (0.000) 2.43 0.02
GDP per Capita 0.000 (0.000) 1.35 0.19 0.000 (0.000) 0.15 0.88 0.000 (0.000) -0.29 0.77
Gini -0.004 (0.007) -0.49 0.63 -0.004 (0.007) -0.55 0.58 0.000 (0.006) 0.02 0.98
Gender (male=1) -0.035 (0.018) -1.94 0.05 -0.028 (0.018) -1.50 0.13 -0.029 (0.018) -1.59 0.11
Age -0.003 (0.002) -1.73 0.08 -0.003 (0.002) -1.80 0.07 -0.003 (0.001) -1.68 0.09
H = Hofstede framework, S = Schwartz framework, M = Minkov framework. Collectivism variable estimates are the reverse-coded results for the Hofstede 
and Minkov individualism indexes for consistency with the other studies.
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US Sample b t p b t p
n = 100
 Condition (COL=1) 0.72 2.26 0.03 0.34 1.88 0.06




 Age -0.00 -0.00 0.99 -0.00 -0.46 0.65
 Gender (male=1) 0.02 0.06 0.96 0.05 0.27 0.79
R2 = 0.23
Indirect effect   b = 0.18 (CI 0.040-0.360)
Chinese Sample b t p b t p
n = 106
 Condition (COL=1) 0.46 1.83 0.07 0.10 0.86 0.39




 Age 0.05 3.02 <0.01 0.00 0.47 0.64
 Gender (male=1) 0.04 0.15 0.88 -0.31 -2.66 0.01
R2 = 0.36
Indirect effect   b = 0.13 (CI 0.003-0.271)
Combined Sample 
(US and China) b t p b t p
n = 206
 Country (CN=1) 0.43 1.86 0.06 -0.07 -0.61 0.54




 Age 0.03 2.11 0.04 -0.00 -0.46 0.65
 Gender (male=1) 0.12 0.54 0.59 -0.12 -1.06 0.29
R2 = 0.24
Indirect effect   b = 0.12 (CI 0.014-0.237)
Indirect effect was estimated using 5,000 bootstrap samples to create a 90% confidence 
interval. b = unstandardized regression coefficient. COL = collectivism. CI = confidence 
interval. CN = China.
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Trust in the Firm
b t p b t p b t p
Condition (Collectivism ad = 1) 0.31 2.91 <0.01 0.18 2.25 0.03 0.14 1.49 0.14
Collectivism 0.17 3.18 <0.01 0.02 0.32 0.75
Trust Propensity 0.40 4.99 <0.01
Control Variables
Age -0.00 -0.59 0.56 0.00 0.26 0.80 -0.00 -1.11 0.27
Gender (male=1) 0.20 1.90 0.06 -0.24 -2.90 <0.01 -0.20 -2.10 0.04
R2 = 0.17
Indirect effect: 
condition → collectivism → trust 
propensity → trust in the firm
b = 0.02 (CI 0.004-0.047)
Indirect effect was estimated using 5,000 bootstrap samples to create a 95% confidence interval. b = unstandardized 
regression coefficient. Condition = individualism versus collectivism ad condition. CI = confidence interval.
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WEB APPENDIX A 
Measurement items and sources 
Trust propensity – adapted from Mayer and Davis (1999) Study 1: α=0.88, Study 3: US α=0.90, 
CN α=0.83; Study 4: US α=0.82 
Most people can be counted on to do what they promise to do. 
Most people can be trusted. 
Most people are honest about their skills and abilities. 
People are generally good and are trying their best. 
Trust in the firm – adapted from Mayer and Davis (1999) Study 4: α=0.91 
Most people at [the firm] can be counted on to do what they promise to do. 
Most people at [the firm] can be trusted. 
Most people at [the firm] are honest about their skills and abilities. 
People at [the firm] are generally good and are trying their best. 
One’s Own Collectivism – adapted from Yoo et al. (2011) Study 2: α=0.86; Study 3: US α=0.88, 
CN α=0.90; Study 4: US α=0.68 
Individuals should sacrifice self-interest for the group. 
Group success is more important than individual success. 
Individuals should only pursue their goals after considering the welfare of the group. 
Group loyalty should be encouraged even if individual goals suffer. 
Collectivism of Others – adapted from Yoo et al. (2011) Study 3: US α=0.93; CN α=0.91 
Most people believe that individuals should sacrifice self-interest for the group. 
Most people believe that group success is more important than individual success. 
Most people believe that individuals should only pursue their goals after considering the 
welfare of the group. 
Most people believe that group loyalty should be encouraged even if individual goals suffer. 
Collectivism of the Firm – Manipulation check Study 4: α=0.94 
Please take a look at the following list of opposing statements about CAPCO, the company in 
the advertisement you just viewed. Indicate how closely you believe the company reflects one 
statement or the other. (semantic differential scale) 
CAPCO emphasizes individuals helping 
themselves by working independently. 
CAPCO emphasizes people helping each 
other by working together. 
CAPCO believes that individuals are 
better off when working hard to help 
themselves. 
CAPCO believes that we are better off 
when working hard together for the good 
of the group. 
CAPCO believes that individuals should 
protect themselves. 
CAPCO believes that we should protect 
the group, and the group should protect us. 
CAPCO emphasizes the welfare of the 
individual. 
CAPCO emphasizes the welfare of the 
group. 
Cultural Tightness – from online supplement to Gelfand et al. (2011). 
Most people believe that individuals should sacrifice self-interest for the group. 
Most people believe that group success is more important than individual success. 
Most people believe that individuals should only pursue their goals after considering the 
welfare of the group. 
Most people believe that group loyalty should be encouraged even if individual goals suffer. 
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Trust propensity scale 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Collectivism scale 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree). Collectivism in Study 1 was measured as the corresponding values framework scores. α = 
Cronbach's alpha. Native Chinese speakers translated all items for the Chinese questionnaire from English to 
Simplified Chinese, which were then back-translated by different translators to ensure translation equivalence. 
Cultural tightness items are listed for reference only. We did not measure tightness directly and instead relied on the 
country-level scores reported by Gelfand et al. (2011). 
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WEB APPENDIX B 
 
Study 3 Individualism-Collectivism priming tasks 
 
Collectivism Condition Prime (Adapted from SDFF-Trafimow, D., Triandis, H. C., & Goto, S. 
G. 1991) 
 
For the next few minutes, please think about what you have in common with your family and 
friends, and write complete sentences in response to the questions below. 
 
First, what are 3 things you have in common with your family and friends? 
 
Now, think about a time when you sacrificed something for the good of benefiting your family, a 
group of friends, or teammates. In a few sentences, describe the situation below, e.g., what did 
you sacrifice and how did it benefit the collective group? 
 
Individualism Condition Prime (Adapted from SDFF-Trafimow, D., Triandis, H. C., & Goto, 
S. G. 1991) 
 
For the next few minutes, please think about what makes you unique and different from your 
family and friends, and write complete sentences in response to the questions below. 
 
First, what are 3 things that make you unique and different from your family and friends? 
 
Now, think about a time when you achieved a personal goal resulting from figuring something 
out independently on your own, or after having made a tremendous individual effort, even 
though your friends or family did not support you. In a few sentences, describe the situation 
below, e.g., what obstacles did you overcome to achieve the goal on your own, or how did others 
interfere with your efforts? 
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WEB APPENDIX C 
 
Study 4 Advertisements 
 
Note to reviewers: The video ads were attached as separate files with closed captions to the 
submission. One of the authors narrated the audio, so in order to protect author identity in the 
review process, the audio has been temporarily removed. 
 
PRINT AD - IDV 
CAPCO 
i n s u r a n c e  
 
Our people believe that insurance is for the 
sake of protecting your personal financial 
wellbeing. 
What works for one person, won’t always 
work for another. 
 








The people at CAPCO Insurance believe that 
insurance is for the sake of protecting your 
personal financial wellbeing. 
 
What works for one person won't always 
work for another. 
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PRINT AD - COL 
CAPCO 
i n s u r a n c e  
 
Our people believe that insurance is people 
working collectively  
to help each other. 
We are better when we pull together  
for the good of the group. 
 
Help protect the group and  
the group will protect you. 
 
 




The people at CAPCO Insurance believe that 
insurance is people working collectively to 
help each other. 
 
We are better when we pull together for the 
good of the group. 
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